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Aiurea... ce datorie externă @speedy... n-auzi că-s mii de români în închisori condamnați pe nedrept?
Așa arată România lor: un stat eșuat, fără mecanisme de apărare în fața corupției, o țară în care hazardul moral e lege. Pentru ei, momentul zero înseamnă debarasarea de problemele din trecut. Pentru Udrea, Bica, Mazăre, Puiu Popoviciu ar însemna întoarcerea acasă curați și spălați de cazier. Pentru restul românilor, același moment zero înseamnă căderea în abisul autocrației.
Sa vedem daca sunt atat de ticalosi incat sa mearga pana la capat cu asta si care va fi in acest caz raspunsul romanilor...
Sper sa nu-ti jignesc ''inteligenta proprie'' si sa ai reabdarea sa vezi o discutie pe viu cu privire la ''Comisia de la Venetia'' la o emisiune din cadrul Antena 3:https://www.antena3.ro/actualitate/descoperiti-ce-nu-spune-propaganda-din-concluziile-preliminare-ale-comisiei-de-la-venetia-478809.htmlVorbesc astia prostii? Daca raspunsul e afirmativ, argumenteaza.
„Un astfel de document, denumit «opinie preliminară», nu trebuia făcut public, pentru că el presupune că urmează să fie modificat. Nu ştiu care sunt procedurile prin care se ajunge la opinia preliminară, dar prima remarcă pe care vreau să o fac pe fond (este că - n.r.) acest document este un document care din punct de vedere juridic mi s-a părut extrem de subţire”, a declarat Tăriceanu„Comisia de la Veneţia tratează lucrurile acestea cu o superficialitate care pe mine mă sperie. Efectiv mă sperie. În ceea ce priveşte opţiunile politice pe care le avem noi în domeniul politicii penale, în domeniul organizării Justiţiei, cred că filtrele pe care le-am avut şi care au funcţionat, inclusiv la Curtea Constituţională, au fost suficiente”
VI. Conclusions155. According to the Romanian authorities, the reform process was necessary and hasbeen undertaken in order to provide answers to existing problems and needs of the judicialsystem and to adapt it to new social realities. The proposed amendments were aimed atstrengthening independence of judges, by separating judges’ and prosecutors’ careers, but alsoat increasing efficiency and accountability of the judiciary. Some of the changes were needed inorder to implement a number of decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court.156. The legislative process took place in a context marked by a tense political climate,strongly impacted by the results of the country's efforts to fight corruption, with controversy anddebate around sensitive aspects both for the continuation of Romania’s efforts in this field andfor the independent functioning of its judicial system. On the one hand, there are reports ofpressure on and intimidation of judges and prosecutors, including by some high-rankingpoliticians and through media campaigns; on the other hand, alleged cases of misuse of theirpowers by some Romanian magistrates, in particular prosecutors, have led to a questioning ofthe methods used to fight corruption. Also, following recent disclosure of co-operation protocolssigned between the Romanian Intelligence Service and judicial institutions, questions are beingraised on the impact of such co-operation on the independence of the judicial institutions and onsafeguards required to protect the judiciary against undue interference.157. At the same time, the legislative process, which has proved to be very divisive for theRomanian society, has been criticised for being excessively fast and lacking transparency, andconducted in the absence of inclusive and effective consultations.158. In view of the urgency of the matter, but also of the complexity of the changesintroduced by the three drafts and of their repeated amendment during the legislative process,this opinion only deals with certain, particularly controversial aspects of the drafts.159. A number of improvements are being proposed, such as the exclusive role of the SCMin the appointment and revocation of high-ranking judges or the separation of the decisionmaking,on judges’ and prosecutors’ matters, within the SCM.160. However, as emphasised in the present opinion, there are important aspects introducedby the three drafts, which seen alone, but especially taking into account their cumulative effect,in the complex political context currently prevailing in Romania, are likely to undermine theindependence of Romanian judges and prosecutors, and the public confidence in the judiciary.161. These include in particular proposed rules affecting the independence of prosecutors,such as the new system for appointment and dismissal of Chief prosecutors, the role of theMinistry of Justice therein and the extended scope of the hierarchical control. Particularconcerns are also raised by the limitation of freedom of expression of magistrates and the newprovisions dealing with the magistrates’ liability, the new Section for investigating offences ofmagistrates, as well as the arrangements weakening the role of the Superior Council ofMagistracy, as the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.162. Although welcome improvements have been brought to the drafts following criticism anda number of decisions of the Constitutional Court, it would be difficult not to see the danger that,together, these instruments could result in pressure on judges and prosecutors, and ultimately,undermine the independence of the judiciary and of its members and, coupled with the earlyretirement arrangements, its efficiency and its quality, with negative consequences for the fightagainst corruption.163. The Venice Commission therefore recommends to Romanian authorities to:- Re-consider the system for the appointment / dismissal of high-ranking prosecutors,including by revising related provisions of the Constitution, with a view to providingconditions for a neutral and objective appointment/dismissal process by maintaining therole of the institutions, such as the President and the SCM, able to balance the influenceof the Minister of Justice;- Remove or better define the provisions enabling the superior prosecutors to invalidateprosecutors’ solution for groundlessness;- Remove the proposed restriction on judges and prosecutors freedom of expression;- Supplement the provisions on magistrates’ material liability by explicitly stating that, inthe absence of bad faith and/or gross negligence, magistrates are not liable for asolution which could be disputed by another court; amend the mechanism for recoveryaction in such a way as to ensure that the action for recovery only takes place once andif liability of the magistrate has been established through the disciplinary procedure;- Reconsider the proposed establishment of a separate prosecutor’s office structure forthe investigation of offences committed by judges and prosecutors; the recourse tospecialized prosecutors, coupled with effective procedural safeguards appears as asuitable alternative in this respect ;- Re-examine, with a view to better specifying them, the grounds for the revocation ofSCM members; remove the possibility to revoke elected members of the SCM throughthe no-confidence vote of the general meetings of courts or prosecutors’ offices(including by the way of petition);- Identify solutions enabling more effective participation, in the work of the SCM, of SCMmembers who are outside of the judiciary;- Abandon the proposed early retirement scheme unless it can be ascertained that it willhave no adverse impact on the functioning of the system;- Ensure that the proposed “screening” measures of magistrates are based on clearlyspecified criteria and coupled with adequate procedural safeguards and a right ofappeal to a court of law, and identify ways to strengthen oversight mechanisms of theintelligence services.164. The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Romanian authorities for furtherassistance.